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MARQUETTE LAH REVIE [.
Due Process of Law - Right of Accused to Counsel - Petitioner,
Victor Drankovich, who had pleaded guilty upon arraignment, was
sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder. After serving
eleven years of the sentence he appealed for a writ of Habeas Corpus
to test the legality of his incarceration. One of the grounds for the
issuance of the writ was that the petitioner did not have the benefit
of, and was not advised of, his right to counsel at public expense.
Held: judgment of conviction was vacated because petitioner had been
deprived of due process. Where the petitioner was illiterate and ignor-
ant of the law, and was without means to employ counsel when ar-
raigned, the court should have refused to accept the plea of gnilty
without approval of counsel. State ex rel Drankovich v. Murphy,
Warden, 22 N.W. 2d. 540 (1946 Wis.).
States are free to regulate procedure in their courts without con-
flict with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment except
where fundamental principles of liberty and justice are invaded.1
Is the right to counsel so fundamental that a denial by a state court
amounts to a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Decisions in support of an affirmative answer are in
the majority in both state and federal practice.2 In the famous Scotts-
boro cases, 3 which involved a conviction for rape, the court decided
that the right to counsel is so fundamental that a denial by a state
court of a reasonable time to allow the selection of counsel of one's
own chosing, and the failure of that court to make an effective appoint-
ment of counsel may so offend our concepts of the basic requirements
of a fair hearing as to constitute a denial of due process contrary to
the Fourteenth Amendment. A recent decision in the case of United
States v. Bergamo,4 conforms with the ruling in the Scottsboro cases.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit there held that
the accused in a criminal case has a constitutional right to the assist-
ance of counsel, and this includes the right to counsel of one's own
choice. Hence, the right to effective assistance is abridged where a
trial judge has refused to specially admit out of state counsel for
1 Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172 at 175 (1899), cited in Twining v. Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.ed. 97 (1908). "The state has the full control over
procedures in its courts both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the
qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights
or conflict with specified or applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution."
2 Brown v. State of Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936) ; Johnson v.
Zerbst, Warden, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357
(1938); Walker v. Johnson, Warden, 312 U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574, 84 L.ed. 830
(1941); Tomkins v. State of Missouri, 323 U.S. 484, 65 S.Ct. 370 (1945) ; Wil-
liams v. Kaiser, Warden, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363 (1945).
3 Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 St. Ct. 55, 77 L.ed. 158, 84 A.L.R.
527 (1932), discussed in 17 Minn.L.R. 415 (1932).
4United States v. Bergamo, 154 F. 2d. 31 (C.C.A. 3, 1946).
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defendants, and local counsel cannot be efficacious because of insuffi-
cient time to prepare the defense.
In Wisconsin the policy as established by Aritcle I, Section 7 of
the Wisconsin Constitution 5 and early construed in the case of Car-
penter v. Dane County," has always been most liberal with respect to
preserving the right to counsel. This right has been held to extend
to having counsel present to protect the rights of the accused at every
stage of the case.7 The Attorney General,8 commenting on Section
357.26 of the Wisconsin Statutes,9 remarked that this section does not
confer the right to appointment of counsel but merely furnishes the
machinery for the exercise of that right and limits the fees. How-
ever it should be construed as broadly as the constitutional provision
which it implements. During the 1945 session of the Legislature this
section' was amended to provide that an accused shall be advised by
the court of his right to counsel upon arraignment.
While it is now a recognized principle of constitutional law that
the right to counsel is a necessary requisite of due process,"' it is
conceded that this fundamental personal right may be waived."
Whether or not there has been an intelligent waiver is sometimes
difficult to determine, particularly where there has been a plea of
guilty. A plea of guilty does not unequivocally amount to a waiver.
The background, experience and conduct of the accused must be care-
fully weighed.' 3 In the present case, there was a finding that the
petitioner did not intelligently waive the right to be represented by
counsel, even though he pleaded guilty. To sustain this finding the
court used the argument that because of illiteracy and ignorance of
the law petitioner was incapable of making his own defense. An al-
5 Wis. Const., Art. I, Sec. 7: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel."
6 Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 249, at 253 (1859) ; "The Circuit Court has
the power and it is its duty to assign counsel to criminals unable to secure such
counsel, as fully as though the power was enjoined by statute."
7 Smith v. The State, 51 Wis. 615 (1881).
8 29 Op. Atty. Gen. (Wis. 1940), p. 449.
9 Wis. Stat. (1939) sec. 357.26.10 Wis. Stat. (1945) sec. 357.26(2): "Upon the arraignment and before plea. of
any person charged with a felony he shall be advised by the court of his right
to counsel, and a record shall be made of such advice upon the minutes of the
court or in a transcript of the proceedings." "
"1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. Vol. I, p. 700.
'2 Dietz v. The State, 149 Wis. 462 at 749, "Every person sui juris who is charged
with crime, has the right to try his own case if he so desires. The trial court
would not have been justified in imposing counsel upon the defendant against
his will, unless it appeared that he was mentally incompetent, or not sui juris
at the time of the trial."
"3U.S.C.A., Const. Amend. 14, Sec. I, note 977 p. 148: "The determination of
whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the accused's right to counsel
so as to render the conviction without assistance of counsel valid must depend
in each case upon the particular facts including the background, experience
and conduct of the accused." Commonwealth ex rel McGlinn v. Smith, Warden,
344 Pa. 41, 24A. 2d 1, (1942).
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lustration of a state court reaching an opposite conclusion upon con-
sideration of different circumstances is afforded by the case of Jones
v. Amrine.1 4 There a state statute required the assignment of counsel
only on request. However, the same court thirteen years previously
in the case of State v. Oberst's ruled in conformity with the instant
case when it held that a seventeen year old youth charged with murder
was denied due process because the court failed to appoint counsel
when the accused changed his plea from not guilty to guilty.18 The
Pennsylvania Court in Commonwealth ex rel McGlinn v. Smith,
Warden," declining to follow the majority rule, held that failure to
appoint counsel was not a denial of due process. The court reasoned
that considering the penitentiary background and experience of the
accused he must have known that professional assistance would have
been given him upon request, and therefore he must be deemed to have
intelligently waived his right to be heard by counsel. In the fin -'
analysis the determination of whether or not there has been a waiver
must depend upon an appraisal of a totality of facts and circumstances
in each individual case. There is no presumption that an accused knows
of his constitutional right to counsel.' 8 Likewise the courts will indulge
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of this constitutional
right.' 9 Consequently the duty of informing the accused devolves
upon the trial judge who should refuse to accept any plea of guilty
without assuring himself that it has been intelligently and compe-
tently waived.20
In the -principal case the counsel for petitioner very ably sum-
marized all of the propositions which have a bearing upon the right
14Jones v. Amrine, Warden, 154 Kan. 629, 121 P. 2d. 263 at 263 (1942): "Where
the accused without counsel and without making a request for counsel person-
ally, understandingly, and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty of burglary in
the second degree, in view of the statute then in force requiring assignment of
counsel only on request, accused thereby waived the right to be represented
by counsel and was not deprived of due process."
'15 State v. Oberst, 127 Kan. 412, 273 P. 490 (1929).
16 A similar result was reached in Coates v. State, 180 Md. 502, 25 A. 2d. 676(1942) when the court of appeals of Maryland held that where counsel was not
appointed for an ignorant and impecunious colored boy of nineteen who was
charged with robbery and pleaded guilty in four cases, the judgments must be
reversed and the pleas of guilty struck because the accused had been deprived
of due process of law.
17 Commonwealth ex rel McGlinn v. Smith, Warden, supra, note 13 at I; "The
trial court's failure to inform the accused of his constitutional right to be
represented by counsel or to provide counsel for the accused was not a denial
of due process in view of the fact that the accused had been previously con-
victed for three separate offenses for which he had been sentenced to prison,
and that he was not therefore ignorant of proceedings in criminal court."
8 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 82 L.ed. 680 (1942).
- Johnson v. Zerbst, Warden, supra, note 2 at 465.20 Johnson v. Zerbst, Warden, supra, note 2 at 465.
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to counsel as an element of due process. They may be outlined as
follows:
1. Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
a defendant accused of murder be furnished counsel.
2. The duty rests upon the trial judge to protect this right.
3. The trial judge should do this whether requested or not.
4. The duty is imperative where the defendant is illiterate,
unacquainted with legal proceedings, isolated and away
from friends, and without funds.
5. There should be a record of the proceedings.
6. It should not be presumed that the accused knew that he
had the right to counsel and voluntary rejected it.
7. A plea of guilty is not a waiver of the constitutional right.
8. The court should not indulge in the speculation as to
whether the defendant was prejudiced by not having counsel.
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